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Abstract
We explore the notion that corporate citizenship, as obtained through Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR), is used by managers to protect rm value, helping their
rm better withstand negative business shocks. We formally explore two parallel mech-
anisms for such protection one of building moral capital (CSR Contributions) and
another of improving investor posteriors (CSR Investments). We nd some theoretical
and empirical support for both of these, but in di¤erent settings. In particular, we
nd that rms with higher CSR Investments enjoy an average of $1 billion of saved
rm value upon an adverse event. In contrast, CSR Contribution rms lose value (on
average) upon an event, possibly due to disingenuous contributions. Meanwhile, due
to managerial moral hazard, rms with high levels of CSR Contributions face adverse
events more often, whereas those with high levels of CSR Investments face them less
often.
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"There is one and only one social responsibility of business to use its resources
and engage in activities designed to increase its prots..." Milton Friedman
"Corporate social responsibility is best seen as the management of risk, as the
avoidance of damages to the companys reputation." Financial Times, July 7,
2004.
There are a plethora of past studies examining the relationship of a rms nancial
performance to its level of corporate social responsibility (CSR). In short, the studies at
best show there is a nominal relation between the two (see Elfenbein (2007) for an extensive
survey). If CSR does not provide any nancial benet, in the spirit of Friedman (1970),
it seems that managers should then spend their time and e¤orts in other areas that are
expected to actually enhance rm value. Indeed, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS),
an MSCI brand, admonishes investment managers in their "2011 U.S. Proxy Voting Guide-
lines Summary" to often vote against CSR type initiatives in order to "protect shareholder
value."
Nonetheless, CSR seems increasingly important to at least some investors, as many
companies now report annually on their social performance, and independent organizations
such as KLD Analytics provide regular corporate accountability reporting. CSR also seems
increasingly important to managers; a survey by the Economist magazine1 reports some
56% of managers consider CSR as a "high" or "very high" priority. Further, the Economist
reports 87% of rms now have a formal CSR program in place. Echoing rm sentiment,
some MBA program ranking schemes now include a standalone category for CSR.
This all suggests that there must be some aspects of CSR that are valuable. In this
spirit, the Economist reports that while only some 6.5% of managers report that CSR
increases revenue, most managers claim they instead use CSR to secure a brand and rep-
1January 7th, 2008
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utation. They summarize it in this way:
Most of the rhetoric on CSR may be about doing the right thing and
trumping competitors, but much of the reality is plain risk management. It
involves limiting the damage to the brand and the bottom line that can be
inicted by a bad press and consumer boycotts, as well as dealing with the
threat of legal action.
Economist, January 7,2008
Thus, in practice, it seems that there is a belief that a primary value of CSR is to
protect a rms value. In this paper, we explore this important notion both theoretically
and empirically.
There are at least two leading theories of CSR as protection. Godfrey (2005) develops
an informal model of protection where rms engage in voluntary philanthropic acts to
build a reservoir of goodwill (i.e., "moral capital") from which to draw upon during an
adverse event. An alternative mechanism proposed by Minor and Morgan (2011) is that
protection comes from improving the posteriors of investors. In particular, those rms that
engage in CSR activities related to an adverse event are given more of the benet of the
doubt concerning their negligence related to the event. For example, if a rm engages in
substantive (positive) environmental CSR, should it become involved in an environmental
disaster, as a result of Bayesian updating, it is less likely the rm is guilty of negligence,
reducing its expected event cost.
We formalize both of these theories to develop sharper and contrasting empirical predic-
tions. While both predict protection of rm value upon an event, there are also important
di¤erences. First, Godfrey (2005) predicts rm protection comes from a rm contributing
to philanthropic activities, which are generally not related to a particular adverse event.
In contrast, Minor and Morgan (2011) argue that protection only comes from engaging in
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those activities that are related to such an event. Second, after we extend both of these
theories by considering what happens to the incident rate of di¤erent types of rms, we
see further di¤erences. In particular, those rms building moral capital should experience
increased incident rates due to moral hazard: being assured of some increased protection
encourages some managers to be less careful in avoiding a disaster. In contrast, protection
as portrayed in Minor and Morgan (2011) is derived from being more conscientious, and
thus incident rates for these protected rms should be lower.
We also complement the extant literature by introducing disingenuous builders of moral
capital. In Godfrey (2005), all actors and activities are transparent. However, in a world
where managers might act strategically, some can choose to free-ride on the positive image
of building moral capital by supercially engaging in CSR. The net result of such rms
is that we should observe diminished protection, if not increased costs, from engaging in
CSR.
The notion of participating in CSR to protect rm value is related to a growing literature
on rm self-regulation. In early work, Maxwell et al. (2000) extend the economic theory
of regulation by adding voluntary actions by rms to reduce pollution under the shadow of
regulation. Maxwell and Decker (2006) show this force also operates in the other direction:
voluntary actions can reduce regulation intensity. This activity helps rms engaging in
voluntary actions by means of reduced regulation and therefore expected cost. Baron
(2010) adds that such self-regulation can also arise from altruistic managers. Whatever
the source of self-regulation, it can increase rm value. In fact, Mackey et al. (2007) argue
that even voluntary actions that are costly in expected value terms can add rm value with
su¢ cient investor demand for such actions. Thus, this paper complements this stream of
literature by exploring yet another potential benet of self-regulation: Those self regulation
activities categorized as CSR can also help protect rm value during adverse events.
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In terms of empirical work on protection by means of CSR, Godfrey et al. (2009) test
the moral capital idea in Godfrey (2005) by conducting an event study on 178 "oppor-
tunistically drawn" rm events. They nd that from the set of rms that they select to
study, those that are engaging in philanthropic focused activities enjoy a reduced loss in
rm value when facing regulatory and legal actions against them. However, rms engaging
in more prot-centric CSR do not enjoy such protection. Similarly, Jacobs et al. (2010)
also nd that philanthropic gifts provide positive rm value. In contrast, Hillman and
Keim (2001) nd just the opposite: engaging in CSR for primary stakeholders (i.e., prot-
centric CSR) increases rm value whereas engaging in CSR for secondary stakeholders (i.e.,
philanthropic) decrease rm value.
In terms of negative CSR, Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010) study stock market
reactions to 64 chemical plant and renery explosions. They nd that those rms with
poor environmental records are punished more harshly. If we count voluntary pollution
abatement as CSR, we nd that positive CSR also hurts rm value. Fisher-Vanden and
Thorburn (2011) show that rms that increase participation in voluntary emissions reduc-
tion lose rm value. Similarly, Jacobs et al. (2010) nd that self-disclosed increases in
environmental performance yield a reduction in rm value. Lyon et al. (2013) nd a nu-
ance in the consequences of positive CSR for rms in China: the penalty for positive CSR
diminishes when rms are state-owned or in high-polluting industries. We complement
these works by formalizing and testing mechanisms that can generate and reconcile these
conicting ndings.
With theoretical predictions in hand, we then explore the CSR activity of large US
public companies from 1991 through 2012. We nd that those rms engaged in CSR
related to adverse events enjoy substantial protection an average of close to $1 billion
of protected rm value and also lower event rates. In contrast, we observe that rms
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that engage in philanthropic CSR unrelated to incidences face events more often and do
not enjoy protection from their CSR e¤orts. In fact, in some cases, they are even further
punished upon an event.
We see this papers contribution as twofold: First, it is the rst paper to formalize
and contrast possible mechanisms that generate protection from CSR, an important and
primary motivation of managers to engage in CSR. In doing so, we extend the theory by
considering incident rates as a way to distinguish between mechanisms. We also introduce
disingenuous rms within the moral capital framework, which identies those cases where
moral capital building might fail to protect rms. Second, using a novel dataset covering
22 years, that is to our knowledge the largest of its kind, we document for the rst time
the relation of CSR to event incident rates. We are also able to identify those cases where
CSR provides protection and shed some light on when CSR actually can help or hurt rms
upon an event.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows: In the rst section we present a
unifying model of CSR as protection, formalizing both Godfrey (2005) and Minor and
Morgan (2011) in a single model. The next section provides an empirical analysis and the
nal section provides a concluding discussion. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
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1 Protection through Corporate Social Responsibility
Managers choose e; t Nature chooses event/no event(s)
Nature chooses high/low risk state Firms with events are revalued
We begin with a simple model of CSR to illustrate and contrast the two mechanisms of
rm value protection. The rst mechanism, which we call CSR Investments, works through
a¤ecting the posteriors of investors, as proposed in Minor and Morgan (2011). The second
mechanism, which we call CSR Contributions, works through the rm building a reservoir
of goodwill from which to draw upon should the rm face an event, as proposed in Godfrey
(2005).
1.1 The Model
Assume managers of each rm type choose their level of CSR activities as well as direct
e¤ort to manage business risk, where risk is the risk of an adverse event. We abstract
away from any agency problems and assume managers maximize rm value. The above
diagram provides the timeline of the game. Managers make two CSR level decisions:
whether or not to invest in operational CSR (i.e., CSR Investments) and whether or not
to contribute to charitable CSR (i.e., CSR Contributions). Formally, we denote these CSR
choices as a vector t = (tC ; twe); where tj 2 fH;Lg for j 2 fC; Ig: H (L) denotes a high-
type (low-type) rm.2 We assume that CSR type is reported through CSR reporting and
2 It is straightforward to extend the analysis to more than two types on each CSR dimension. However,
we restrict the choice to two types since this is su¢ cient to illustrate the forces at work and eases exposition.
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is thus publicly observed . The element tC (tI) denotes a rms binary choice of CSR
Contribution (Investment). While it costs zero for a rm to be a low-type, choosing to be
a high-type costs a rm cj . CSR cost is the realization of a privately observed random
variable having support [0;1) over an atomless distribution function Fj (). For simplicity
assume that draws from FC() and FI() are IID across and within rms.
A manager also chooses a level of e¤ort e  0; which is unobservable. Manager e¤ort
helps keep a rm from an undesirable outcome, as explained below. E¤ort costs are increas-
ing and convex. For simplicity, suppose that the cost of e units of e¤ort is C (e) = 12e
2.
Thus, whereas cj is a xed cost to engage in higher CSR, C (e) is the ongoing cost of
responsibility.
The combination of CSR activity and managerial e¤ort determine the business risk
state  2 fh; lg of the rm. If an adverse event occurs while the rm is operating in a high
risk state, it will prove more costly than if it is in a low risk state, as discussed below.
With probability tIe the low risk state is realized, while the high risk state occurs with
complementary probability. The parameter tI represents the inuence of CSR investment
activity on the business risk state, where 0 < L < H . In other words, CSR Investment
reduces the chance of being in the high risk state. Following the state realization, nature
then determines whether an adverse event occurs. With probability p an event occurs in
state ; where 0 < pl < ph. That is, events are less likely to occur if the rm is operating
in the low risk state than in the high risk state. Note CSR Contributions do not a¤ect the
return to e¤ort in keeping a rm out of a high risk state. Hence, a rm with or without
CSR Contributions can have either L or H :
Stakeholders (e.g., investors and regulators) only observe whether an event, E; has
occurred and the rms level of CSR Investment (i.e., and thus tI ) and CSR Contribution.
Since a managers e¤ort is unobservable, stakeholders must make an assessment of the
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likelihood that the rm was operating in a high risk state conditional on an event occurring.
Dene
 (t) = Pr [ = hjE; t] : (1)
That is,  (t) denotes the (equilibrium) beliefs of stakeholders that the rm was in the
high risk state conditional on an event occurring and the rms level of CSR activity. A
rm triggering an event from a high risk state can be thought of as having been "at fault,"
whereas if the event was triggered from a low risk state the rm is not "at fault." A rm
then su¤ers loss K, scaled by the stakeholders belief  (t) that the rm was operating
in a high risk state. That is, being "at fault" is more costly than not being "at fault."
However, this loss upon an event is tempered by the rms potential building of moral
capital. As explained in Godfrey (2005), through a CSR Contribution a rm builds a
reservoir of goodwill that can either provide an increased benet of the doubt or lessen
the stakeholder-induced penalty upon a bad event (or both). We capture this potential
benet by the expression

1
MItC=RC+1

in equation (2) : Increased moral capital M means
an increased benet upon an event.
To summarize, the expected prots of a rm with private cost parameters cj choosing
public CSR types tj and private e¤ort e are
 (c; t; e) = 0 
P
j
cjItj=Rj 
1
2
e2 f(1  te) ph + teplg

 (t)K

1
MItC=RC + 1

: (2)
Here, Ij is an indicator function which equals one if the manager chooses a high level of
CSR Investment (and) or Contribution. I denote status quo prot 0. In short, expected
prot is then status quo prot, minus the total cost of CSR, minus the cost of e¤ort, minus
the unconditional expected cost of an event.
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To summarize the various states, Figure 1 provides a schematic for all of the possible
outcomes:
[Figure 1 here]
There exist unique values (eL; e

H) corresponding to the equilibrium e¤ort of a rm. To
see the claim regarding (eL; e

H) , notice that for given a tc, the optimal e¤ort choice for a
manager of rm type t is a globally concave problem having as its solution:
et = tI (ph   pl)

 (t)K

1
MItC=RC + 1

: (3)
To close the model, it remains to determine equilibrium beliefs. Recall that stakeholders
know a rms type and can thus deduce its equilibrium e¤ort. Hence, from Bayesrule,
upon an event, stakeholders hold belief
 (t) =
 
1  tIet

ph 
1  tIet

ph + te

tpl
: (4)
Thus, any equilibrium e¤ort levels given tc simultaneously solve
eL = L (ph   pl)
(
(1  LeL) phK 
1  NeL

ph + Le

Lpl

1
MItC=LC + 1
)
; (5)
eH = H (ph   pl)
(
(1  HeH) phK 
1  HeH

ph + He

Hpl

1
MItC=HC + 1
)
:
The optimal pair of tI and tC chosen is then simply a function of comparing prots from
eL and e

H given each tC 2 fH;Lg : In equilibrium, there exists some cI such that when
xing the choice of tC ; we have the same level of prot whether that manager chooses her
rm to be a low (L) or high (H) type
11
 (0; L; eL) =  (c

I ; H; e

R) : (6)
This can readily be seen by noting  () is strictly decreasing in cj and  (0; H; eR) > 0
while  (cI ; H; eR) < 0 as cj ! +1: By similar argument, when xing the choice of tI ;
there is some cC such that the manager is indi¤erent between choosing tC 2 fH;Lg:
This analysis provides the rst proposition:
Proposition 1 Fix tC : In equilibrium, managers of high-type (low-type) rms exert e¤ort
eH ( e

L) as given in (5) and face CSR cost cI  cI (cI > cI);where cIsolves equation (6).
We next need a Lemma to prove our propositions concerning changes in rm values
upon an event and incident rate of events.
Lemma 1 Fix tC . In any equilibrium, LeL < He

H :
What this Lemma tells us is that if we compare two rms that are the same on the
dimension of CSR Contribution tC , even though the high-type rm has a greater return to
e¤ort, it will still produce enough e¤ort such that Le

L < He

H . This yields an important
empirical prediction, as this inequality is necessary for the CSR investing rm to be less
likely to have an event, as shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 Compared with CSR Investment low-type rms, CSR Investment
high-type rms have events less often and lose less value upon an event.
The intuition of the above proposition is with CSR Investment, the manager essentially
internalizes the cost of an adverse event and increases her e¤ort to reduce it. This increased
e¤ort both reduces the chance of an event and also reduces the change in rm value upon
an event because investors now consider it less likely the event was caused by negligence.
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This proposition then provides two key predictions that we can test in the data while
holding CSR Contribution level constant: increased CSR investment level both reduces the
event incident rate and reduces the loss of rm value upon an event. The next proposition
considers the parallel case of changes in levels of CSR Contributions, holding a given CSR
Investment level constant.
Proposition 3 Compared with CSR Contribution low-type rms, CSR Contribution
high-type rms have events more often and lose less value upon an event.
The intuition for this proposition is that when a rm is provided a reservoir of goodwill
to draw upon during an adverse event, this induces moral hazard on behalf of the manager.
That is, due to the goodwill protection, she now puts in less e¤ort since an adverse event
will prove less costly. Consequently, the rms incident rate is increased. As far as we
are aware, this is a novel nding; the extant literature stresses the protection value of
goodwill building upon on an event. However, there has been no discussion of how this
can induce moral hazard. Nonetheless, even with such moral hazard, the rm still enjoys
a net protection benet upon an event; as shown in the appendix, the positive e¤ect of the
goodwill reservoir dominates the negative e¤ect of this increased chance of negligence. This
last proposition also reveals that comparing incident rates as a function of the type of CSR
(i.e., Contribution versus Investment) can help us disentangle the sources of protection
from CSR.
2 Empirical examination
2.1 General strategy
The empirical setting is product markets where the event is a product recall. These events
are often seen by the investment committee as a potential shock to a rms value and
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reputation due to their signaling nature (Davidson and Worrell (1992) provide a review of
past product recall literature. See also Hartman (1987) for a hedonic model treatment of
recalls). These types of events are arguably more exogenous than some events studied in
the extant literature, such as choosing to join a CSR organization (e.g., Fisher-Vanden and
Thornburn (2011)) or disclose ones intention to increase CSR (e.g., Jacobs et al. (2010)).
Our empirical strategy has two facets. First, we will test if rms engaged in CSR
Investment (CSR Contributions) have a lesser (greater) incident rate. Second, we then
test if those rms engaged in each type of CSR experience a lesser loss in rm value upon
an event. I begin by reviewing the data characteristics and then turn to the event study
methodology and regression model.
2.2 Data
The Data consist of three components. The rst part is the abnormal returns of various
rms during our product recalls, which we describe in detail in the next section. The event
returns are then merged with Compustat, the second set of data. For rm control data
of the S&P 500 rms we have: annual sales ("Sales (net)"), asset value ("Assets-total"),
market value ("common shares outstanding""price-calender year-closing"), and percent
of prots per share ("EPS (Basic) - Exclude Extra. Items ""price-calender year-closing").
Actual product recall events were obtained by hand collection of product recall events of
S&P 500 rms as indexed by the Wall Street journal from 1991 through 2012. Although
this categorization of product recalls is certainly not perfect, it is the primary source used
by past product recall literature. Further, we wanted to have an ex-ante xed criteria of
selecting recalls to prevent subjective inclusion or exclusion on the part of the researcher.
We do note that recalls included in the Wall Street Journal press announcements are biased
towards larger event recalls. However, the theory predicts that it is these large scale recalls
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where we will see the e¤ects, if any exist.
Occasionally some rms had more than one event announcement in a year, most often
a later press announcement related to the same event. For the data collection, we simply
summed the abnormal returns together, following the methodology as shown below, by
summing abnormal returns over event window days. Having more than one event in a
year for a given rm occurred for only 25 of the rm/ event years, and these were almost
exclusively for automobile companies.
The nal component of data is corporate accountability reporting from KLD Analytics,
owned my MSCI. KLD is a main source of CSR research for socially responsible investing
rms. Nelson Informations Directory of Investment Managers reports that these types of
investing rms hold approximately 11% of all managed assets. KLDs data have been
commonly used in past related academic studies (see Chatterji et al. (2007) for a review).
KLD conducts proprietary research to assign annual CSR ratings to publicly held rms
across various dimensions, including product markets. Their CSR ratings began in 1991,
making it one of the oldest corporate accountability reporting sources. We use data from
1991 though 2012.
To match our theoretical predictions, we need to use a measure of CSR that is related
to the event and another CSR activity that is not. In this spirit, we use CSR ratings on the
dimensions of product markets and community reputation to respectively represent these
activities. The former then captures the notion of investment in issue-related CSR (i.e.,
CSR Investments) and the latter proxies for the contribution of moral capital (i.e., CSR
Contributions).
CSR reputation in product markets (i.e.,CSR Investments) can be thought of as a
rms superior reputation earned from the conscientious creation, marketing, and distri-
bution of its products. "GoodCSR will mean that a rm typically embraces superior
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quality assurance procedures in the development and production of its products, conducts
ethical marketing campaigns, provides products with extra social value, provides products
to disadvantaged demographic groups, and generally faces product recalls voluntarily. In
contrast, "Bad" CSR means that rms are usually involved in regulation ghts, su¤er
safety violations, accept lower product safety standards, and conduct limited due diligence
on their supply chain.
Community CSR (i.e., CSR Contributions) can be thought of as the extent to which
a rm positively impacts its surrounding communities. Examples of "Good" community
CSR are giving a meaningful portion of income to charity, maintaining an exceptional
employee volunteer program, or supporting local housing and education needs. Examples
of "Bad" community CSR might include being involved in projects considered to have a
negative economic impact on the local community, not respecting local indigenous people
in the rms operation decisions, or being involved in major local tax disputes.
For both kinds of CSR, we categorize rms into three types, as follows. The lowest
type, which we will call "Low" types, are involved in "Bad" things for the given type of
CSR. The next type, "Medium" types, are not involved with "Bad" things, but neither are
they involved in "Good" things they are simply responsible corporate citizens. Finally,
there are some exceptional rms that not only avoid being involved in "Bad" things, but
are also participating in some extra "Good" things. We dub these "High" types. We
include a full summary of "Good" and "Bad" types of CSR used by KLD in the appendix.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for our primary variables. As can be seen,
roughly 7% (13%) of rm-years a rm will earn a High Product (Community) reputation.
Meanwhile, some 74% (80%) of rm-years fall in the middle of being classied as high
on the dimension of Product (Community) CSR. The balance of rm-years are considered
"Low" types. Now we consider our rst primary theoretical prediction concerning event
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rates.
[Table 1 about here]
2.3 The Risk of Incident
Recall, our propositions predict that rms with high Product CSR should have lesser event
incidence rates, whereas those rms with high Community CSR should have greater event
incidence rates. To test these predictions, since possible outcomes are only zero or one, we
use a logit random-e¤ects panel regression.3 We specify our full regression as
Pr (yit = 1jXit 1;; ; i) = 
 
i +i +CSRit 1 +X0it 1 +Y
0
t;

(7)
where i  N
 
0; 2

: The variable CSRi;t 1 contains CSR ratings for rm i based on
the previously dened CSR typologies. The vector Xi;t 1 contains nancial controls, as
outlined in the section (2:2) ; and also industry controls. Finally, the vector Yt contains
year dummies.
With this regression, we can ask a simple question: is it the case that CSR reputation
either in terms of CSR Investments or CSR Contributions is related to incident rates
as theory predicts? Table 2 reports the results of this regression. Column (1) provides
the baseline regression, which includes year xed e¤ects but not nancial and industry.
We nd, as predicted by theory, high-type rms involved in building moral capital through
Community CSR are more likely to have an adverse event. For Product CSR, as consistent
with theory, high-type rms are less likely to have an adverse event. Even after including
3Note that it is not feasible to utilize a conditional xed-e¤ect logit model since identication requires
dropping all rms that never experience an event (i.e., 93:5 % of all observations are dropped).
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all of our discussed controls, the coe¢ cient estimates for either high-type of rm are still
signicant at the 1% or 5% level.
If we extend our main theory to medium-type rms, these rms should have the same
direction of estimated e¤ect as high-type rms, but the e¤ects should be attenuated. For
Community CSR, high-type Community CSR rms have greater estimated coe¢ cients. A
Wald test of equality of the high- and medium-type Community CSR coe¢ cients yields a
2 = 24:83 (p-value= :0000). We note that medium-type rms have estimated coe¢ cients
statistically no di¤erent from low-type rms.
For Product CSR, medium-type rms are less likely than low-type to have an event.
However, the magnitude of the estimates are no di¤erent statistically from the high-type
rms: a Wald test yields 2 = :22 (i.e.,p-value= :649). In short, our empirical results
are consistent with our theoretical predictions; however, we cannot empirically distinguish
medium- and low-type community rms from one another and we cannot distinguish high
and medium-type Product CSR rms from one another. That is, if we relabeled medium-
type Product CSR rms as high-type and relabeled medium-type Community CSR rms
as low-types, the empirical results would perfectly align with the baseline theory results
that explore binary CSR types.
[Table 2 about here]
We also ran a Probit random-e¤ects model, the results of which are nearly identical and
can be found in Table 3.We now turn to our second primary prediction the protection
value of CSR. To do so, we utilize a nancial event study.
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2.4 Financial Event Study
Financial event studies are a common way to quantify the nancial impact of an adverse
rm event.4 The particular factor model I use is the commonly used Fama/ French model
(see Fama and French (1997)). Expected return in this setting is then estimated via:
Rit = i + iRM;t + SiSMBt +HiHMLt + "i;t (8)
That is, the return of the stock equals a rm xed e¤ect, plus a sensitivity to the general
market return RM , sensitivity to small stocks versus large stocks (SMB), and nally a
sensitivity to high versus low book to market type stocks. Coe¢ cients are estimated from
a time series just before, but disjoint, to the particular event of interest; here, following
common practice, the estimation period begins 8 months prior and ends 30 days prior to
the event. These coe¢ cient estimates are then used to predict the return during the event
period. That is, the predicted return around the event period becomes:
bRit = bi + biRM;t + bSiSMBt + cHiHMLt (9)
We use this estimated returns model from the rst step to predict what the
expected returns are during the event of interest and then calculate the "abnormal return,"
dened as the di¤erence in actual return from the predicted return: ARi;t = Ri;t   bRi;t:
The cumulative abnormal return is then simply the sum of these returns. For this study,
we rst use the day before and the day of the event announcement as our "event window."
This is the most stringent of windows; we want to minimize the e¤ect of any other previous
or subsequent news confounds. We begin the window the day before, as is practice, to
capture any "news leakage" the day before the event announcement. For a robustness
4For a thorough review see MacKinlay (1997). Godfrey et al. (2009) show a more recent use of the
method.
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check, we also include 3-day and 4-day windows, where we again begin the day before
the event, but then extend the window an additional 2 or 3 days from the event day,
respectively. Thus our primary cumulative abnormal return is then simply:
CARi =
0X
t= 1
ARi;t (10)
where 0 is the event day.
2.5 The Impact of Incident
Once we calculate our cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) through a nancial event study
on every rm facing an adverse event, our nal step is to examine any relationship between
the product CSR level and the respective CAR via a cross sectional regression. In partic-
ular, we specify the following:
CARi = + CSRi +Xi +Yt + "i (11)
CARi is the cumulative abnormal return for rm i as calculated in the previous section.
The coe¢ cients of interest are again in the vector ; our CSR ratings.
Now we include industry controls using NAICS codes. Ideally, we would like to control
at the 3-digit level. However, we only have 192 to 242 observations, depending on the
specication. Hence, using 3-digit level xed e¤ect estimation requires close to as many
coe¢ cient estimates as observations, yielding a rather imprecise regression. Thus, for
comparison, we also include analysis at the 2-digit level.
Table 4 reports these regression results using event windows of just one day, as explained
in section (2:4) :
[Table 4 about here]
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As predicted by our theory, high-types in Product CSR save a substantial amount
of abnormal rm value upon an event some 2.5-3.2%. This e¤ect is also economically
signicant, as it amounts to an average saved rm value of close to $1 billion for the
average rm experiencing an event.5 Medium-type Product CSR rms save about half
of the value of a high-type rm, though the estimates are not signicant at conventional
levels. In contrast, high-type Community CSR rms do not seem to enjoy any protection,
as predicted by theory. Interestingly, point estimates are negative, suggesting these rms
are actually punished upon an event. Meanwhile, medium-type Community rms do, in
fact, experience statistically signicant negative abnormal returns upon an event. This is
consistent with Luo et al. (2012) that nd the same for the setting of oil spills: moral
capital built through goodwill can cause increased damage to a rm upon a negative event.
In all, this suggests our theory is missing something. How could investing in moral capital
cause a reduction in rm value? It turns out that if we allow for some strategic moral-
capital-building rms, these results can rationalized, which we explore in the next section.
2.5.1 Greenwashing
Let us now allow that there could also be some rms that make disingenuous CSR Contri-
butions in hopes of enhancing short-term rm value. In terms of environmental CSR, this
is often called greenwashing (see Lyon and Maxwell (2011) for an extended explanation).
In this paper, we refer to greenwashing to mean making disingenuous CSR Contributions
as opposed to disingenuous environmental CSR.
Assume that stakeholders cannot determine if CSR Contributions are genuine until
after an event occurs. After an event does occur, investigations lead to information that
was not publicly available before such an event. Thus, after an event, rms that have
5This is calculated as 3% of the average value of a rm experiencing an event, which is roughly $37
billion (i.e., :03  37 = 1: 11):
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been greenwashing are penalized (e.g., Lyon and Maxwell (2011)). This conceptualiza-
tion of greenwashing can be captured in our setting by simply assuming that upon an
event, greenwashing rms experience M < 0. That is, they are penalized for having been
discovered greenwashing.
Thus, we have two types of rms that make CSR Contributions: true rms and green-
wash rms, denoted as T and G; respectively. The former are those that we have modelled
thus far: they enjoy reduced event cost from MT > 0; as before. In contrast, greenwash
rms have reduced moral capital upon an event: MG < 0. That is, if discovered, such
a rm would have been better o¤ not greenwashing. Recall that a rm that makes no
Contribution (i.e., a low-type Contribution rm) receives M = 0:
It is then straightforward to show that upon an event, given enough greenwashing rms,
those rms that invest in moral capital have on average a greater loss in rm value than
those that do not invest in moral capital. That is, genuine moral capital building rms still
enjoy protection, but a su¢ cient number of penalized greenwash rms cause the average
of all rms to be negative. Further, as can be shown, as long as there are not too many
greenwash rms, investing in CSR Contributions can still produce positive net present
value for both greenwash and genuine CSR Contribution rms. This means that we can
still witness CSR Contributions in equilibrium.
In terms of event rates, greenwash rms will have lower incident rates than genuine
Contribution rms. This is because greenwash rms anticipate that if they do have an event
it will be more costly, thus increasing the rms incentive and e¤ort to limit the chances of
an event. If we assume that greenwash rms are more likely to reside in medium- rather
than high-type rm categories, then we would expect to observe our empirical results:
medium-type rms CSR Contribution rms should be less likely to have an event and
should have a more negative event return. These two predictions are true empirically
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when comparing coe¢ cient estimates via a Wald test for coe¢ cient estimates reported in
column (4) in Table 2 and Table 4, respectively: p-values of approximately :0000 and :06;
respectively. Now we consider some alternative explanations for our baseline results.
2.5.2 Additional Considerations
One concern in estimating these rm value e¤ects is that abnormal return may simply be
the expected direct cost (e.g., the cost of replacing faulty automobile tires) of the product
recall. If the CSR level is related with actual event cost, this in itself would be interesting,
as it indicates that CSR predicts the magnitudes of rmsdirect event costs. In this case,
there is less room for our CSR protection story where the nancial market prices a company
upon an event as a function of uncertainty over the degree of negligence. Unfortunately,
the expected direct cost of a product recall is seldom made public (nor is it commonly
disclosed ex-post). However, for our sample, roughly 10% of the announcements were
accompanied by estimates of the direct event costs. For this subsample, the direct costs
explain roughly 16% of the variation in CAR. Further, when a loss is sustained by a rm
(i.e., a negative CAR), the direct costs represent 38% of the total loss on average. In
absolute value terms (because occasionally a rm has a positive CAR during an event),
direct costs represent 26% of the value of CAR. Thus, while this sub-sample is only a small
portion of the events6, it suggests that it is not the expected direct cost of an event driving
di¤erences in CAR. Further, the direct costs have a small di¤erence in cost, whereas
the change in abnormal rm value varies widely, suggesting there is much more than just
product recall direct cost embedded in the CAR. Our theory suggests that the CAR should
be a combination of direct recall loss and (expected) nancial loss.
Another concern is that CSR ratings might simply serve as a proxy for a rms product
6There was also no statistical di¤erence between the observables of rms having direct costs reported
and those that did not.
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quality and safety and thus the ratings do not really capture any notion of corporate
citizenship. That is, product CSR is highly (positively) correlated with a rms reputation
for product safety. It could be that investors simply update the expected cost of the rms
event based on how safe the companys products are: the safer the products, the more likely
the nal cost will be less for a rm. To explore this possibility we disaggregate the regressors
to include each of the eight KLD rating areas with all of the controls used in column 4
from Table 2. We nd one standalone subcategory that marginally explains the di¤erential
CARs: market practices. The point estimate is  :03 with a p-value of 11%. Thus, if a rm
is involved in some illegal or unethical market-practice dispute (e.g., predatory pricing or
collusion), it loses an additional 3% of abnormal rm value. Meanwhile, KLDs measure of
"product safety" reputation is not signicant (p-value of 57%). In all, this suggests, just
as KLD claims, that their ratings have something to do with corporate citizenship and not
only product safety.
For estimating the value of protection of rm value, we have used 1-day event windows.
This is the strictest specication, as it minimizes the chances that a really important
additional piece of news on a later day somehow contaminated the event e¤ect. To explore
this possibility, I redid all of the analysis that yielded Table 4 using a 3-day window and
also a 4-day window. That is, I calculated the abnormal return as occurring from the
day before until 2 and 3 days after the event day, respectively. These results are reported
in Table 5 and Table 6, and as expected, are consistent with those presented in Table 4.
This suggests that any new news or orthogonal shocks experienced in the immediate days
following the event are not enough to (abnormally) change the value of the rm.
[Tables 5 and 6 about here]
One can also estimate what a rm should pay for such conscientiousness to see if the
above estimates are reasonable. In terms of benet, a rm moving from low-type to high-
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type via CSR Investment saves some $1 billion of rm value conditional on an event, as
shown in section (2:5). With an incident rate of .9%, this means a risk neutral rm should
be willing to pay up to $9 million per annum more to be a higher rather than low CSR
type.7 It would be useful to compare this gure with what rms actually spend on these
e¤orts. Unfortunately, this level of expense gures is rarely made public. However, for one
example, Merck reported its 2010 annual report total spending on CSR related activities
of $9.8 million. Although this is only data from a single SP500 rm, this provides an
instance in which the above estimates are reasonable. Hopefully, public disclosure of its
CSR expenses will become more common, allowing us to identify actual CSR expenditures
by rms in the future.
3 Concluding discussion
We found an explanation to the puzzle of why managers invest in CSR when it has no
apparent e¤ect on prots: Managers use CSR as a means to protect rm value. However,
there are two di¤erent mechanisms scholars have proposed, which we formalized in this
paper. The rst and most common one is the notion that managers use CSR to build
moral capital, which we termed CSR Contributions. This reservoir of goodwill can then be
drawn upon should the rm face an adverse event. However, a consequence of this, which
is not identied in the extant literature, is that managers will engage in moral hazard and
actually increase the chances of adverse events. To the extent increased incident rates are
the result of reduced managerial e¤ort, we found this moral hazard result to be true in the
data. Meanwhile, we found that if some rms are strategic and engage in greenwashing
to articially inate valuations, such moral capital building might actually cause increased
7That is, since there is only a :9% chance the average $1 billion benet will be realized in a given year,
this sugests an annual benet of $9 million.
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losses in rm value upon an event. We found some suggestive empirical evidence of this,
as well.
In contrast to CSR Contributions, the other proposed mechanism consists of managers
investing in CSR related to a potential adverse event. For this setting, in equilibrium,
those rms with higher levels of CSR related to the issue over which they face an adverse
event are less likely to have been negligent. Thus, these kinds of rms both have events
less often and are punished less severely upon an event. We found the data to support
both of these predictions of so-called CSR Investments.
In conclusion, both of these mechanisms seem to be operating, although CSR Contribu-
tions seems to be operating in some unanticipated ways compared to the extant literature.
Consequently, it is only CSR through the second mechanism that seems to provide protec-
tion, on average.
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4 Appendix: Proofs from the Text
Lemma 1 Fix tC . In any equilibrium, LeL < He

H :
Proof. We proceed by means of contradiction: suppose to the contrary that LeL  HeH .
Equivalently, Le

L=He

H  1. Using equation (3) we can write
Le

L
He

H
=

L
H
2  (L)K  1MItC=LC+1
 (H)K

1
MItC=HC+1

and after substituting with equation (4) ; we obtain
Le

L
He

H
=

L
H
28><>:
(1 LeL)ph
(1 LeL)ph+LeLpl
(1 HeH)ph
(1 HeH)ph+HeHpl
9>=>; : (12)
Next, notice that the function
 (x) =
(1  x) ph
(1  x) ph + xpl
is strictly decreasing in x: Therefore, the value of the expression in the curly brackets in
equation (12) is at most one. Since LH < 1; it then follows that the RHS equation (12) is
fractional, which contradicts the hypothesis that Le

L=He

H  1.
Proposition 2 Compared with CSR Investment low-type rms, CSR Investment
high-type rms have events less often and lose less value upon an event.
Proof. To ease notation, dene Pr(E j t)   1  tIet ph + tIetpl and E[C j t] 
 (t)K

1
MItC=HC+1

:Though we could solve for et explicitly using the quadratic formula,
it is much simpler to use the fact that we always have eLL < e

HH in equilibrium (Lemma
1). Indeed, this inequality implies that the CSR investing rm is less likely to have an
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event. That is, it is then we have Pr(E j H) < Pr(E j L) and E[C j H] < E[C j L].8
Proposition 3 Compared with CSR Contribution low-type rms, CSR Contri-
bution high-type rms have events more often and lose less value upon an event.
Proof. Holding tI xed, sinceM > 0; a lesser e

t solves e

t = tI (ph   pl)

 (t)K

1
MItC=HC+1

if ItC=HC = 1: This implies that high-type CSR Contribution rms have a greater chance of
experiencing an event since @ Pr(Ejt)@et < 0. Thus, as opposed to the case of CSR Investments,
there are opposing forces in determining the net expected cost E[C j t] upon an event. On
the one hand the moral capital M built helps the rm upon an event, but investors further
discount the value of the rm due to the likelihood of increased negligence (i.e., a greater
 (t)): To see the value of moral capitalM dominates the negative e¤ect of  (t) ; we rewrite
E[C j t] as
E[C j t] = e

t
tI (ph   pl)
:
Taking the derivative with respect to M yields
@E[C j t]
@M
=
1
tI (ph   pl)
@et
@M
< 0;
where the inequality results since @e

t
@M < 0.
5 Appendix: KLD Accountability Reporting of CSR
KLD forms Good and Bad CSR from the following sub-categories of analysis:
8We could add a formal calculation of the change in the present value of the rm upon an event.
However, as long as the absolute event rate is low, which ts our empirical setting, adding such a feature
only complicates the exposition and changes neither the results nor the intuition.
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5.0.3 Product Market CSR
Good CSR Quality: The company has a long-term, well-developed, company-wide qual-
ity program, or it has a quality program recognized as exceptional in U.S. industry.
R&D/Innovation: The company is a leader in its industry for research and development
(R&D), particularly by bringing notably innovative products to market.
Benets to Economically Disadvantaged: The company has as part of its basic mission
the provision of products or services for the economically disadvantaged.
Other Strengths: The companys products have notable social benets that are highly
unusual or unique for its industry.
Bad CSR Product Safety: The company has recently paid substantial nes or civil
penalties, or is involved in major recent controversies or regulatory actions, relating to the
safety of its products and services.
Marketing/Contracting Concern: The company has recently been involved in major
marketing or contracting controversies, or has paid substantial nes or civil penalties re-
lating to advertising practices, consumer fraud, or government contracting. (Formerly:
Marketing/Contracting Controversy)
Antitrust: The company has recently paid substantial nes or civil penalties for an-
titrust violations such as price xing, collusion, or predatory pricing, or is involved in recent
major controversies or regulatory actions relating to antitrust allegations.
Other Concerns: The company has major controversies with its franchises, is an elec-
tric utility with nuclear safety problems, defective product issues, or is involved in other
product-related controversies not covered by other KLD ratings.
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5.0.4 Community Reputation CSR
Good CSR Charitable Giving: The company has consistently given over 1.5% of trailing
three-year net earnings before taxes (NEBT) to charity, or has otherwise been notably
generous in its giving. In 2002, KLD renamed the Generous Giving Strength as Charitable
Giving.
Innovative Giving: The company has a notably innovative giving program that supports
nonprot organizations, particularly those promoting self-su¢ ciency among the econom-
ically disadvantaged. Companies that permit nontraditional federated charitable giving
drives in the workplace are often noted in this section as well.
Non-US Charitable Giving: The company has made a substantial e¤ort to make char-
itable contributions abroad, as well as in the U.S. To qualify, a company must make at
least 20% of its giving, or have taken notably innovative initiatives in its giving program,
outside the U.S.
Support for Housing: The company is a prominent participant in public/private part-
nerships that support housing initiatives for the economically disadvantaged, e.g., the Na-
tional Equity Fund or the Enterprise Foundation.
Support for Education: The company has either been notably innovative in its support
for primary or secondary school education, particularly for those programs that benet
the economically disadvantaged, or the company has prominently supported job-training
programs for youth. In 1994, KLD added the Support for Education Strength.
Indigenous Peoples Relations: The company has established relations with indigenous
peoples in the areas of its proposed or current operations that respect the sovereignty,
land, culture, human rights, and intellectual property of the indigenous peoples. KLD
began assigning this strength in 2000. In 2002 KLD moved this strength rating into the
Human Rights area.
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Volunteer Programs: The company has an exceptionally strong volunteer program. In
2005, KLD added the Volunteer Programs Strength.
Other Strengths: The company has either an exceptionally strong in-kind giving pro-
gram or engages in other notably positive community activities.
Bad CSR Investment Controversies: The company is a nancial institution whose lend-
ing or investment practices have led to controversies, particularly ones related to the Com-
munity Reinvestment Act.
Negative Economic Impact: The companys actions have resulted in major controversies
concerning its economic impact on the community. These controversies can include issues
related to environmental contamination, water rights disputes, plant closings, "put-or-pay"
contracts with trash incinerators, or other company actions that adversely a¤ect the quality
of life, tax base, or property values in the community.
Indigenous Peoples Relations: The company has been involved in serious controversies
with indigenous peoples that indicate the company has not respected the sovereignty, land,
culture, human rights, and intellectual property of indigenous peoples. KLD began assign-
ing this concern in 2000. In 2002 KLD moved this strength rating into the Human Rights
area.
Tax Disputes: The company has recently been involved in major tax disputes involving
Federal, state, local or non-U.S. government authorities, or is involved in controversies over
its tax obligations to the community. In 2005, KLD moved Tax Disputes from Corporate
Governance to Community.
Other Concern: The company is involved with a controversy that has mobilized com-
munity opposition, or is engaged in other noteworthy community controversies.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 242 -0.007 0.066 -0.369 0.492
Event (Indicator) 26585 0.009 0.095 0.000 1.000
High Product CSR 26586 0.070 0.256 0.000 1.000
High Community CSR 26586 0.132 0.339 0.000 1.000
Medium Product CSR 26586 0.738 0.440 0.000 1.000
Medium Community CSR 26586 0.796 0.403 0.000 1.000
Market Value (millions) 26498 6501.489 23239.860 0.000 626550.400
Market to Book 26458 2.135 1.471 1.000 27.716
Leverage 25689 0.209 0.195 -0.010 4.910
Year 26586 1991 2012
Table 2: Event Rates and levels of CSR (Logit) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Event
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Product CSR -1.0447*** -0.9153*** -0.9994*** -0.8696**
(-3.18) (-2.77) (-2.90) (-2.53)
High Community CSR 0.7313** 0.8345*** 0.9670*** 0.8742**
-2.46 -2.73 -2.77 -2.51
Medium Product CSR -1.3278*** -1.1978*** -1.1519*** -1.0268***
(-6.30) (-5.51) (-5.01) (-4.51)
Medium Community CSR -0.4427 -0.3501 -0.3076 -0.2791
(-1.51) (-1.15) (-0.88) (-0.80)
Observations 26581 25620 25498 25498
Log Likelihood -909.2426 -844.7997 -685.9662 -656.6200
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls (NAICS) No No 2 digit 3 digit
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<.01
Table 3: Event Rates and Levels of CSR (Probit) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Event
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Product CSR -0.4856*** -0.4547*** -0.4931*** -0.4346***
(-3.20) (-2.93) (-3.10) (-2.71)
High Community CSR 0.3816*** 0.4299*** 0.4966*** 0.4483***
(2.65) (2.91) (2.97) (2.67)
Medium Product CSR -0.6267*** -0.5673*** -0.5606*** -0.5020***
(-6.45) (-5.63) (-5.29) (-4.73)
Medium Community CSR -0.1769 -0.1295 -0.0893 -0.0830
(-1.26) (-0.89) (-0.54) (-0.50)
Observations 26581 25620 25498 25498
Log Likelihood -906.4960 -840.3725 -679.8645 -651.6976
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls (NAICS) No No 2 digit 3 digit
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<.01
Table 4: Magnitude of Firm Value Protection and Levels of CSR (1 day window) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Event
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Product CSR 0.0244** 0.0311*** 0.0324** 0.0249*
(2.49) (2.70) (2.50) (1.91)
High Community CSR -0.0130 -0.0242* -0.0250 -0.0245
(-0.93) (-1.75) (-1.29) (-1.22)
Medium Product CSR 0.0097 0.0157 0.0155 0.0128
(1.10) (1.38) (1.22) (0.93)
Medium Community CSR -0.0260* -0.0352** -0.0454** -0.0461**
(-1.69) (-2.32) (-2.08) (-2.20)
Observations 242 228 192 192
R Squared 0.092 0.169 0.215 0.291
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls (NAICS) No No 2 digit 3 digit
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<.01
Table 5: Magnitude of Firm Value Protection and Levels of CSR (3 day window) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Event
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Product CSR 0.0177 0.0237 0.0279* 0.0216
(1.20) (1.46) (1.67) (1.30)
High Community CSR -0.0090 -0.0268* -0.0314 -0.0288
(-0.48) (-1.71) (-1.46) (-1.26)
Medium Product CSR 0.0144 0.0205 0.0168 0.0161
(1.30) (1.53) (1.06) (0.96)
Medium Community CSR -0.0327 -0.0473*** -0.0607** -0.0628***
(-1.59) (-2.68) (-2.51) (-2.66)
Observations 242 228 192 192
R Squared 0.093 0.169 0.211 0.280
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls (NAICS) No No 2 digit 3 digit
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<.01
Table 6: Magnitude of Firm Value Protection and Levels of CSR (4 day window) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Event
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Product CSR 0.0257** 0.0322** 0.0314** 0.0270*
(2.14) (2.37) (2.11) (1.91)
High Community CSR -0.0149 -0.0297* -0.0307 -0.0287
(-0.88) (-1.93) (-1.48) (-1.30)
Medium Product CSR 0.0107 0.0163 0.0156 0.0144
(1.10) (1.33) (1.09) (0.97)
Medium Community CSR -0.0358** -0.0489*** -0.0622*** -0.0642***
(-1.97) (-2.99) (-2.71) (-2.83)
Observations 242 228 192 192
R Squared 0.072 0.162 0.210 0.268
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls (NAICS) No No 2 digit 3 digit
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<.01
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A Probability Tree for the Likelihood of Firm Events 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm effort is 𝑒𝑒, firm type is 𝛾𝛾, and 𝑝𝑝ℎ  and 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙  are the probability of the firm in a high and low risk state experiencing an event, respectively. 
 
